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Introduction 
 
 
New Climate Leadership 
“Yes we can ... after all” – the United States is caught between international ambitions 
and domestic challenges 
Susanne Dröge / Sonja Thielges 
In a push for climate protection in the US, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency has proposed new CO2 emission limits for power plants. This is the next step in 
President Barack Obama’s agenda on tackling climate change and the measures taken 
by the US administration are highly pertinent in the run-up to a new UN climate agree-
ment in 2015. In June at the Bonn climate talks, the American push was welcomed. At 
the latest G7 summit a new climate deal was supported as well, and the US took the 
lead in bringing the issue forward. The EU has to balance its role as a key partner for 
developing countries under the UN framework with increasing its influence on key 
negotiators to promote climate protection as a global goal. 
 
On 2 June, the US proposed regulation to 
limit the CO2 emissions of its power plants. 
This came at the same time as negotiations 
under the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Bonn, and the G7 summit in Brussels.  
During UNFCCC talks in 2009, the US 
pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emis-
sions to 17 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020. A federal climate bill passed the US 
House of Representatives in the same year, 
but never made it through the Senate. Since 
then the president has been bypassing re-
sistance from climate change sceptics, and 
the general gridlock in Congress, with re-
ference to the Clean Air Act of 1970, which 
authorises him to regulate greenhouse gases 
without the explicit approval of Congress. 
Climate pledges made under a UNFCCC 
treaty need to be approved by Congress. But 
for now at least, Congress cannot challenge 
Obama’s international leadership. 
Climate Action Plan and “Clean 
Power” Plan 
In 2013 the Obama administration present-
ed a comprehensive Climate Action Plan 
which led to a number of separate initia-
tives: in September 2013 the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed carbon 
standards for building new power plants; 
in March 2014 the White House published 
its strategy to reduce methane emissions; 
and stricter emissions standards are being 
drafted for heavy duty vehicles. Then in 
May, various federal agencies and depart-
ments published their third joint climate 
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 report, warning of the consequences of 
climate change for the US. The Clean Power 
Plan currently being proposed is especially 
significant, as almost 40 percent of CO2 
emissions in the US are caused by power 
plants. 
The plan sets CO2 limits for fossil fuel 
fired power plants in the US, approximately 
1000 in total. Full implementation of the 
plan could reduce CO2 emissions from these 
power plants to 30 percent below 2005 
levels by 2030. The emission goals differ 
from state to state, depending on their cur-
rent power plant CO2 emissions as a pro-
portion of total electricity production in 
2012, and on their capacity to make reduc-
tions through increased efficiency or use 
of renewable energy. For instance, the gas 
producing state of North Dakota would 
only have to reduce by 11 percent com-
pared to 2012, whereas Washington state 
would have to reduce by 72 percent; how-
ever, Washington would reach this goal, 
largely through the closure of an old coal 
power plant. 
The Chances of Success 
The EPA must be prepared for tough resis-
tance to its plan. Objections to the regu-
lation will come from Congress, the coal 
producing states, climate change sceptics 
as well as companies and Republican rep-
resentatives who plan to sue the EPA.  
Although it usually takes several years to 
implement executive regulations, this one 
has a good chance of succeeding. President 
Obama will likely veto any congressional 
attempts to block it, regardless of the re-
sults of the midterm elections this winter. 
He knows that the majority of the popula-
tion, from all political camps, are in favour 
of an active climate policy by the US govern-
ment. Moreover, the plan accommodates 
the coal producing states not only by allow-
ing for a flexible approach, but also by 
setting goals for them that are much less 
strict than for other states. The courts, too, 
are on Obama’s side, having repeatedly 
approved the EPA’s regulatory power in 
recent years. At most, objections will lead 
to delays, thereby posing a political risk.  
The public may submit comments on 
the proposed rule by October, and the final 
proposal is scheduled for June 2015. States 
must submit their implementation plans 
by June 2016, though this deadline may be 
extended as far as June 2018, subject to the 
establishment of regional emissions trading 
systems. The approval and revisions phase 
is scheduled from June 2017 to June 2019. 
By January 2017 there could be a new presi-
dent, possibly a Republican, which could 
also mean a change at the top of the EPA. 
However, if the new president were to com-
pletely revise the emission rules after three 
years of planning, this would draw heavy 
criticism, especially from the states and 
power plants affected. 
Impact on the US 
Successful implementation of the Clean 
Power Plan could reduce healthcare costs 
and positively affect the energy sector as 
well as the job market. Although electricity 
prices are projected to rise until 2030, con-
sumers could see their electricity bills drop 
due to improved energy efficiency. Further-
more, the healthcare sector would save 
between 55 and 93 billion dollars due to 
reduced smog and soot. According to the 
EPA, jobs will be lost in the coal industry 
because 19 percent of the electricity pro-
duced by some 600 coal power plants would 
no longer be competitive. On the other 
hand, the EPA expects a net 108,000 jobs 
to be created in the energy and energy effi-
ciency sector by 2020. 
Yet despite all this, the Clean Power Plan 
is not a truly ambitious step towards climate 
protection. CO2 emissions from US power 
plants have already fallen by 13 percent 
since 2005, and there are no comparably 
robust plans for other sectors (especially 
private households and industry). It is im-
portant to note that the emission reduction 
targets of 30 percent below 2005 levels are 
not binding; this is only the case with the 
state-specific emission limits for power 
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 plants. Moreover, dependence on fossil 
fuels has not been fundamentally reduced 
but shifted to gas. Shale gas extraction 
through “fracking” releases methane, which 
is much more harmful to the climate than 
CO2. Positive effects on the climate will 
therefore only be achieved if Obama’s meth-
ane strategy is implemented. 
Nevertheless, the speedy departure from 
coal sends an important signal. Moreover, 
focusing the Clean Power Plan on the states 
is a promising strategy as they have gained 
expertise in energy and climate policy over 
the years and have a tradition of close co-
operation with the EPA. 
US Leadership in International 
Climate Negotiations? 
The US was actively involved in the early 
stages of UN climate negotiations in the 
1990s, and especially the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, after the Bush administration 
rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the US 
became an outsider. Over the next few years 
the EU took on a leading role in climate 
policy, but since 2009 the roles have chang-
ed once again. Apparently unimpressed by 
the Europeans’ pursuit of an ambitious 
international deal, the US, along with China 
and other newly industrialised countries, 
forged the “Copenhagen Accord” at the UN 
climate summit in Copenhagen. This put 
global climate protection on a voluntary 
basis rather than establishing it under 
binding international laws, a move which 
proved popular with many countries. The 
UNFCCC’s Cancún Agreements of 2010 
specify targets for over 90 countries to be 
met by 2020. To some extent, the US can 
claim credit for the successes of interna-
tional negotiations over the last few years, 
which from a European perspective are 
rather modest. 
Obama’s International 
Commitments 
The 2013 Climate Action Plan sets out 
President Obama’s international commit-
ments in his second term of office. The plan 
is based on the US international climate 
policy approach: no binding reduction 
targets; technological solutions to reduce 
emissions; bilateral cooperation with newly 
industrialised countries; forest protection; 
transparency and measurability; and tack-
ling so-called “short-lived climate pollut-
ants”, i.e. gases which remain in the atmo-
sphere for a brief period of time (e.g. black 
carbon) but have a considerable influence 
on local air quality and the climate. The 
plan also highlights energy efficiency and 
“clean” energy sources as important tools 
in climate protection. 
The US government is making its mark 
on the international stage with foreign 
policy initiatives. In 2012, former US Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton played a key 
role in the establishment of the Climate 
and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-
Lived Climate Pollutants, which now com-
prises 75 partners. Since 2013, US Secretary 
of State John Kerry has been driving for-
ward cooperation on climate policy with 
the Chinese government. 
During the last two decades cooperation 
between China and the USA on climate 
policy seemed problematic, if not unthink-
able. This was due to the US administra-
tion’s steadfast refusal to agree to interna-
tional climate action without climate tar-
gets for the largest emerging countries. 
Rethinking Strategy – not just in 
the United States 
Since Copenhagen, however, the Chinese 
position has changed. International respon-
sibility is no longer a taboo subject. Due to 
the dynamic economic growth, the Chinese 
government faces a number of economic, 
energy and health policy problems. Air 
and water pollution are among the most 
severe challenges for the Chinese popula-
tion. Beijing is showing signs that it might 
agree to emission reductions on an inter-
national level. At the Petersberg Climate 
Dialogue in July, the Chinese climate minis-
ter Xie Zhenhua announced that China will 
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 restrict its rising emissions from 2020 on-
wards. The US Secretary of State’s initiative 
will help smooth misunderstandings be-
tween the two countries in the run-up to 
UN negotiations. As well as cooperating to 
fight local air pollution, the two countries 
have announced their common interest in 
ensuring successful negotiations in Paris in 
2015. 
It is not yet clear whether the US will 
reach its Copenhagen climate target of a 
17 percent reduction by 2020 (compared 
with 2005); but according to the European 
Environment Agency, the EU will actually 
exceed its 2020 climate target, achieving 
a 24.5 rather than 20 percent reduction 
(compared with 1990). However, given the 
extent of the economic and debt crisis of 
recent years, the EU can no longer pursue 
the ambitious climate policy it laid out in 
its climate and energy package of 2008, 
since member states have no appetite to 
commit to this policy. Instead, the European 
Commission has proposed a new climate 
target of minus 40 percent, to be reached by 
2030. It would benefit the UN process if this 
target were agreed by European leaders 
soon, but the EU will probably not commit 
itself before spring 2015, the agreed deadline 
for setting post-2020 targets under the 
UNFCCC. 
A commitment by key countries at the 
UN summit in New York in September 
2014 (hosted by Ban Ki-Moon) would send 
a strong signal of support to the UN pro-
cess. However, the US will not make early 
promises regarding the post-2020 period 
either. The Obama administration is still 
elaborating how to agree on a target year 
and reduction ambition given the domestic 
hurdles in implementing international 
commitments posed by Congress. 
EU: Balancing Ambition and Realism 
From a European perspective the US in-
volvement in international climate policy 
is crucial, especially as it touches on some 
key issues for a comprehensive deal, such 
as the verifiability of measures or develop-
ment cooperation. But the US commit-
ment will only spread to other countries 
if it specifies concrete climate targets after 
2020 and also makes financial commits to 
climate protection. 
However, greater US involvement also 
reduces the likelihood that Germany and 
the EU’s calls for ambitious, binding cli-
mate targets will be met. In the run-up to 
the UNFCCC summit in Paris, the US may 
well press for more flexibility over nation-
al climate protection, which would allow 
countries to scale back their ambitions. 
Using the Clean Power Plan as a model, 
climate targets could be set for just a few 
economic sectors, rather than for the eco-
nomy as a whole. Germany and the EU 
should therefore continue to keep up their 
calls for national targets. 
Meanwhile, the German government can 
harness Obama’s push in its diplomatic bid 
for success in Paris. In 2015 Germany takes 
over the G7 presidency. With the Paris deal 
in mind it should – in addition to pressing 
for climate targets – focus on ensuring that 
money is made available for the Green 
Climate Fund. 
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